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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, both the U.S. financial markets and the global economy
faced the worst crisis since the Great Depression. The events
surrounding the financial crisis involved a complex array of financial
transactions, "[a] failure of several Wall Street financial firms," 1 and a
collapse of the housing market. 2 Responding to that crisis, Congress
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S. in Business
Administration with a focus on Accounting, 2009, University of Central Florida. I would like to
thank my family and friends for their continued support throughout my legal education and
development. I would also like to thank the University of FloridaJournal of Law and Public
Policy for selecting this Note for publication and for their hard work.
1. Z. Jill Barclift, Too Big to Fail, Too Big Not to Know: Financial Firms and
Corporate Social Responsibility,25 J. CIv. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 449, 449-50 (2001).
2. Charles M. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
431
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enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank).3
The principal cause 4 of, and blame for, the financial crisis is5
debatable. 4 For instance, some suggest that the cause was deregulation,
while others suggest that greed, on the part of lenders, borrowers, and
investors, caused the crisis. 6 Others, however, point the finger to the7
corporate governance failures of major financial corporations.
Congress, in an attempt to address those concerns, increased
derivatives 8 regulation 9 and implemented corporate governance
reform.' 0 In this regard, Congress imposed significant burdens on the
vehicle that revolutionized both American and global business: the
corporation.
In the years following World War I, the U.S. economy soared and
rapidly. 11
the use of corporations as a form of doing business grew
Now, the corporate entity is perhaps the most dominant form of social
organization competing only with big government. 12 The popularity of
the corporate form, as compared to a partnership,' 3 is partially
attributable to the concept of limited liability. 14 That is, investors
typically face no risk of monetary loss beyond the value of their
investment.' 5 In exchange for limited liability, however, investors trade
in their ability to control their investment by vesting control in corporate
managers. 16 As such, the corporation is an attractive vehicle for both
Act: What Caused the FinancialCrisis and Will Dodd-FrankPrevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU
L. REv. 1243, 1244 (2011).
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L.
No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
4. Sharon E. Foster, Systemic Financial-ServiceInstitutions and Monopoly Power, 60
CATH. U. L. REV. 357, 358 (2011) (discussing underlying policies and history leading to the
financial crisis).
5. Id. at 358 n.2.
6. See Murdock, supranote 2, at 1255-78.
7. Brooksley Born, Forward: Deregulation:A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 231,231 (2011).
8. For a discussion on derivatives, see infra text accompanying notes 23 & 34.
9. Murdock, supra note 2, at 1244.
10. See Dodd-Frank, § 951 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1).
11. Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate Governance 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 184, 2012).
12. Michael R. Seibecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 170 (2010).
13. Jing Li, Money Under Sunshine: An Empirical Study of Trust Contracts of Chinese
Hedge Funds, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 61, 70 (2012).
14. Carol R. Goforth & Clayton N. Little, A Review of Piercing the Veil Cases in
Arkansas, 2011 ARK. L. NOTES 17, 17 (2011).
15. Id.
16. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives, CorporateHedging, and ShareholderWealth:
Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039, 1053 (1998). This is the
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raising capital and making investments.
This Note addresses Congress's regulatory response to the financial

crisis and concludes that Dodd-Frank promotes an inefficient form of
corporate governance. Part II of this Note provides a background on the

financial crisis and on the theory underlying corporate governance. Part
III of this Note then analyzes two components of Dodd-Frank: the
regulations it imposes on derivative transactions and its say-on-pay
provisions. Moreover, Part III addresses the impact of those regulations

on corporate governance.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Backgroundon the FinancialCrisis
17
The financial crisis of 2008 nearly destroyed the global economy.
Many blame the financial crisis on the emergence of "too big to fail"
firms. 18 Those firms engaged in a complex array of financial
transactions involving the use of derivatives and sub-prime lending. 19 It
is those transactions to which much blame has been attributed.
A derivative, the most basic example of which is an option
contract, is a bilateral contract that derives its value from some
underlying source. 2 1 Derivative users fall into either of two categories:
hedgers and speculators. 22 Hedgers use derivatives to reduce risk by
offsetting a current position, 223 whereas speculators attempt to profit by

embracing the risk that hedgers seek to avoid.24 Although most

concept of "separation of ownership and control." Nevertheless, investors do retain some control
over their investment given the relative ease of transferring their interest in the corporation.
17. Murdock, supra note 2, at 1244.
18. Barclift, supra note 1, at 453. "'[T]oo big to fail' refers to a banking or financial
organization so large that the federal government must support and prevent the collapse of the
institution because its failure poses a significant risk to the entire financial and economic
systems." Id.
19. Murdock, supra note 2, at 1244.
20. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside-Out Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 147, 186
(2011). For example, the value of an option contract, which "[provides] the owner [of the
contract with a] right to either buy or sell an asset at a future date for a specified premium,"
necessarily depends on the value of the asset at the time the option is exercised. Id.
21. Krawiec, supra note 16, at 1045. The contract might derive its value based on
changes in interest rates or currency values. Skeel, supra note 20, at 150.
22. Krawiec, supranote 16, at 1045.
23. Id. For example, Southwest Airlines engaged in the most well-known use of riskhedging derivatives when it negotiated a derivative contract that allowed it to buy fuel at a
substantially reduced price. MARK JICKLING & KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41398, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE VII,

DERIVATIVES 1 (2010).
24. Krawiec, supra note 16, at 1045.
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users, the existence of
derivative losses have been linked to speculative
25
those users is necessary for others to hedge.
Derivative transactions have typically been conducted either on
exchanges or in over-the-counter (OTC) markets.26 Exchanges, which
are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), are "centralized
markets where all the [transactions] come together."2 7 In contrast, the
historically unregulated OTC market
28 is not centralized and typically
involves only the contracting parties.
Prior to Dodd-Frank, financial institutions, engaging in the highly
lucrative process of securitization, used complex derivatives known as
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations
(CDO).29 The securitization process is described as follows: a bank
makes a loan to a homeowner and collateralizes the loan with a
mortgage. The bank then sells that mortgage to a financial company
such as Bear Stems. The financial company then combines the
mortgages in a pool of other mortgages (the MBS) and sells interests in
the MBS on the secondary market. A CDO is similar to an MBS in
that both are asset-backed securities.32 The difference, however, is that
the pool of underlying assets from which a CDO derives its value may
consist of other asset-backed securities, including MBSs. 33 Further,
CDOs are divided into 34"different 'tranches' [(or slices)] that reflect
[varying] levels of risk."
25. See Kimberley D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New FinancialBingo": A Risk-Based
Approach to UnderstandingDerivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (1997).
26. See MARK JICKLING & KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41398, THE
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE

VII, DERIVATIVES

2 (2010).
27.

Id.

28. See id.
29. Barclift, supra note 1, at 450. An MBS, a type of asset-backed security, is "a debt
obligation[] that represent[s] [a] claim[] to the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans." U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgage

securities.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
30. See Kimberly Amadeo, Role of Derivatives in Creating Mortgage Crisis,
http://useconomy.about.com/b/2008/10/l 13/role-of-derivatives-in-creating-mortg
ABOUT.COM,
age-crisis.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
31. See id. The MBS, therefore, derived its value from the group of mortgages in the
bundle. Id. More specifically, the mortgage payments, when made, are used to pay the MBS
investors. See id.
32.

William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943,959 (2009).

33. Id
34. Michael Bennett, Complexity and Its Disconnects: Recurring Legal Concerns with
Structured Products, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 811, 811 n.3 (2011). For example,
[the] senior tranche is generally the first to absorb cash flows and the last to
absorb mortgage defaults or missed payments. As such, it has the most
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35
The highly profitable nature of securitization incentivized volume
and, as a practical matter, required lenders to broaden their consumer
base by expanding their lending practices. However, while the demand
from investment banks to buy mortgages increased the lenders' supply
of available "credit-worthy" borrowers decreased.36 The solution to this
problem of economic scarcity was simple in the eyes of lenders: subprime lending. 37 Although such lending practices posed a greater risk
than traditional
lending, lenders alleviated this risk by charging higher
38

interest rates.

It is essential, at this point, to note two critical effects of this process.
First, once the lender sold the mortgage, the lender became disinterested
in the borrower's repayment; that is, the lender not only circumvented
the risk of a default, but also, realized its profit on the mortgage by
selling it for a premium. 39 This process created a "morally hazardous
environment" 40 because a borrower's creditworthiness was of minimal
concern to a lender who could sell the mortgage to an investment
banker. 4 ' Second, the source from which these MBSs and CDOs
derived their values encompassed these riskier sub-prime mortgages.
The lucrative nature of securitization was paramount. Everybody
was making money. Investors, relying on the false assumption that
housing values would always appreciate 42 and on misleading credit
ratings,43 viewed these securities as highly profitable safe bets.44
predictable cash flow and is usually deemed to carry the lowest risk. On the
other hand, the lowest rated tranches usually only receive principal and interest
payments after all other tranches are paid. Furthermore they are also first in line
to absorb defaults and late payments.
CDOs and the Mortgage Market, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/07/cdo-Mortgages.asp#axzzlqe4PS xGA (Jan. 19, 2011).
35. Barclift, supra note 1, at 456-57.
36. Id. at 457.
37. See id. Sub-prime lending is the process of lending to borrowers with either low
credit scores or limited credit history. Id.
38. See id.

39. Id.
40. Id.at 456.
41. See Murdock, supra note 2, at 1318.
42.

See Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime Financial

Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REv. 549, 550 (2009), availableat http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=2711 &context=-facultyscholarship&sei-redir=1 &referer-http%3A%2F%2
Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar/o3Fhl%3 Den%26q%3 Dcollapse%2BoP/o2Bfinancial%2Binsti
tutions%26assdt%3D2%252ClO%26asylo%3D2008%26asvis%3DO#search=%22collapse%
20financial%20institutions%22.
43. See Murdock, supra note 2, at 1249. A credit rating represents the score a credit
rating agency assigns to a particular security after undertaking an independent evaluation of the
security. Id. at 1301-02.
44.

Seeid. at 1315-16.
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Further, American International Group Inc. (AIG), relying on its AAA
credit rating and on the same false premises,4 recognized an
opportunity to make a handsome profit. 46 AIG thereby enhanced the
attractiveness of these securities by selling credit default swaps (CDS)
to the investment bankers. 47 Borrowers, lenders, investors, and insurers
were in a euphoric state of financial success.
Then, as borrowers began to default and the value of homes began to
drop,48 the flaw of securitization surfaced: profitability only ensued as
long as either borrowers could repay their debts or lenders could
foreclose on and resell the collateralized homes. 49 The decrease in
housing values created a domino effect of mortgage defaults. As such,
CDS
the MBSs and CDOs were rendered seemingly worthless 5and
0
liability.
significant
to
exposed
were
AIG,
particularly
issuers,
B. Backgroundon CorporateGovernance
The overwhelming majority view in the United States is that the
primary purpose of the corporation is to maximize the shareholder
wealth. 5' However, a distinct characteristic of the corporate form is the
separation of ownership and control model. 52 That is, shareholders do

45. See id. at 1316.
46. See id. at 1319.
47. See id. at 1316. A CDS, which is very similar to insurance, "'allow[s] a purchaser of
the swap to transfer loan default risk to the seller of the swap. The seller agrees to pay the
purchaser if a default ever occurs."' Id. at 1312 n.423 (quoting FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N,
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE

CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 444, 540 (2001)
(Wallison Dissent), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf).
48. Dov Solomon & Odella Minnes, Non-Recourse, No Down Payment and the Mortgage
Meltdown: Lessons from Undercapitalization, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 529, 546-48
(2011). In fact, the decline in housing prices left many homeowners with negative equity. Id.
This, therefore, incentivized borrowers to default on their loans and walk away from their
homes. Id
49. Jordan Rand, A FundamentalHuman Right: Expanding Access to Affordable Housing
for Latin America's Low - and Middle-Income Families, 13 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 945, 965-66
(2007). However, as the supply of homes for sale increased, their values correspondingly
decreased. As a result, it became difficult for lenders to foreclose on and sell the collateralized
homes. See Solomon & Minnes, supra note 48, at 547-48.
50. Bryan G. Faubus, Narrowing the Bankruptcy Safe Harborfor Derivatives to Combat
Systemic Risk, 59 DUKE L.J. 801, 803-04 (2010).
51. Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business Judgment
Rule: Arguments for Expanded CorporateDemocracy, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 3 (2010);
see also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (holding that "it is not
within the lawful powers of the board of directors to ... conduct the affairs of the corporation
for the. . . incidental benefit of shareholders.").
52. See Krawiec, supra note 16, at 1053.
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not partake in the process of maximizing their own wealth.53 Instead,
the operation of the corporation is solely within the purview of agents,
directors and the officers, employed to act on
namely the board of 54
behalf of shareholders.
A fundamental tension sits at the core of the separation of ownership
and control model. The model, which empowers individuals other than
a corworation's owners to manage corporate affairs, increases agency
costs. 5 Namely, it increases the risk that managers will spend a
corporation's earnings in a way that advances their personal interests
rather than those of the shareholders. 56 This agency problem has
promulgated the debate that centers on two distinct models of corporate
governance: the shareholder primacy model and the director primacy
model.57 Further, it has resulted in debates as to the best method for
reducing agency costs.
1. Shareholder Primacy, Director Primacy, and the Business
Judgment Rule
The shareholder primacy model suggests that "corporate managers
In
should only make decisions for the benefit of [shareholders] .
contrast, the director primacy model "defends managerial discretion in
order to maximize shareholder wealth., 59 Despite the shareholder
primacy model's predominance in the United States, shareholders often
have little recourse against a board of directors for decisions that fail to
maximize shareholder wealth or for decisions that result in corporate
losses. Such lack of recourse is due to the business judgment rule,
corporate law's central doctrine, which offers great deference to a
board's decisions. 60 For example, and as it pertains to the financial crisis
in particular, the shareholders of the financial institution, Citigroup,
sued the board of directors for allowing the corporation to engage in

53. Id. In fact, before the rise of institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual
funds, shareholders played an extremely passive role in conducting corporate affairs. See
Seibecker, supra note 12, at 181.
54. See Krawiec, supra note 16, at 1053.
55. See Andrew L. Bethune, An Efficient "Say" on Executive Pay: Shareholder Opt-in as
a Solution to the ManagerialPower Problem, 48 Hous. L. REV. 585, 590 (2011).
56. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND

PRACTICE 6 (2008).
57. See Seibecker, supra note 12, at 183.
58. Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 51, at 4.
59. Seibecker, supra note 12, at 184.
60. Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 51, at 16-17; see also, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237
N.E.2d 776, 781 (11. App. Ct. 1968) (refusing to second-guess Wrigley's business decision not
to host home baseball games at night).
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sub-prime lending. 61 Nevertheless, the court upheld the board's decision
by affording it the protection of the business judgment rule. 62 As such,
the business judgment rule insulates a board of directors from liability
to the extent
the board's decision is in the best interest of the
63
corporation.
On its face, the business judgment rule appears to undercut the goal
it purports to serve. However, the ability of directors to make "swift
decisions" was a contributing factor to the rise and success of large
corporations in the twentieth century. 64 Thus, the rule advances
shareholder interests because it "allows [directors and officers] to
maximize shareholder value in the long-term by taking risks without the
debilitating fear that65they will be held personally liable if the company
experiences losses."
2. Mitigating Agency Costs: Interest Alignment or
Shareholder Empowerment
The agency problem permeates throughout corporate law because of
the conflicting interests inherent in the separation of ownership and
control model. In an effort to mitigate agency costs, some suggest that
the solution is aligning the interests of executives with those of
shareholders. 66 Proponents of interest alignment insist that it reduces
agency costs and promotes economic efficiency by making it more
beneficial for executives to 67
advance shareholder interests than to
advance their own self-interest.
Interest alignment is generally accomplished through performance-68
based compensation such as bonuses and equity-based compensation.
In theory, these compensation packages reduce agency costs by
incentivizing management to advance shareholder interests. However,
critics of this solution to the agency problem suggest that performancebased compensation is exactly what encouraged the directors and
officers of financial institutions to adopt a risky "maximize profit in all
circumstances" philosophy. 70 Further, the solution fails to account for
61. See In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 113 (Del. Ch.
2009).
62. Id. at 139.
63. Id.
64. Bethune, supranote 55, at 590.
65. In re Citigroup,964 A.2d at 139.
66. See Bethune, supra note 55, at 591.
67. See id at 591.
68. Id. Equity-based compensation, such as stock options and stock appreciation rights, is
the concept of compensating executives with equity interests in the company. Id.
69. Id.
70. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
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the divergent risk profiles of shareholders and executives.71 For
instance, shareholders have a conservative risk profile because their
profit depends solely on the price of the stock.72 In contrast, directors
and officers, whose stock options are coupled with handsome salaries,
can embrace risk because they have no sunk economic investment to
lose. 73 In fact, performance-based compensation is widely
regarded as
74
one of the biggest contributions to the financial crisis.
Another potential solution to the agency problem is shareholder
empowerment. 75 Advocates of this solution suggest that "enhanced
shareholder rights provide accountability and that accountability
[reduces] agency costs.,, 76 Proponents of shareholder empowerment
further insist on enhanced shareholder rights, such as shareholder choice
regarding business decisions.77 In contrast, opponents of this solution
argue that enhanced shareholder rights would decrease business
productivity because shareholders possess neither adequate knowledge
nor the expertise to effectively conduct corporate affairs. 78 In adopting
Dodd-Frank, Congress took the view that shareholder empowerment
was the preferable mechanism for reducing agency costs.
III. THE DODD-FRANK ACT

Dodd-Frank, Congress's regulatory response to the financial crisis, is
inadequate in two respects. First, with respect to its regulation of
derivatives, Dodd-Frank fails to account for moral and economic policy
considerations. In effect, the Act promotes morally hazardous trading
and impedes risk management. Additionally, although President Obama
commented that Dodd-Frank empowers shareholders with respect to
executive compensation, 79 in substance, it purports to empower
shareholders with respect to a subset of corporate law in which no
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 653, 658-59 (2010).
71. Murdock, supra note 2, at 1264.
72.

See id.

73. Id.
74. See Danielle Angott Higgins, Regulation S-K Item 402(S): Regulating Compensation
Incentive-Based Risk through Mandatory Disclosure, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1049, 1051
(2011).
75. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 70, at 655.
76. Id.
77. Id.at 662.
78. See Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? ShareholderStakeholder Debates in a ComparativeLight, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 641, 661 (2011).
79. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-streetreform-and-consumer-protection-act).
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empowerment is warranted.
A. Dodd-Frank'sRegulation of Derivatives: Competition Between
Moral and Economic Policy
In an effort to improve transparency, Dodd-Frank extensively
regulates the previously unregulated OTC derivatives market.8 ° Title
81
VII of Dodd-Frank seeks to standardize OTC derivative transactions. 82
For instance, Dodd-Frank requires public reporting of transaction data
and creates clearing and margin requirements. 83 In effect, Dodd-Frank
makes it illegal for parties to enter into certain OTC derivative
84
transactions unless the transaction has been submitted for clearing.
Further, with respect to trades involving certain derivatives, DoddFrank prohibits the use of OTC markets and requires the use of
85
regulated exchanges in which multiple market participants can trade.
This Part first assesses the concerns surrounding the use of derivatives,
specifically CDSs, and then analyzes both the efficacy of the foregoing
regulatory reform in addressing those concerns and the consequences of
those reforms on corporate governance.
From a policy standpoint, CDSs create a morally hazardous
environment. A comparison of CDSs to insurance contracts is
illustrative because CDSs serve a similar function to insurance
contracts. 86 Despite their functional similarities, the two products do not
share an important requirement: the requirement of an insurable
interest. 87 As it pertains to life insurance contracts, the insurable interest
requirement seeks to reduce the moral hazard inherent in those contracts
by requiring that insurance policy beneficiaries have some interest in an
insured's life88 beyond the mere pecuniary interest resulting from the
80. Murdock, supranote 2, at 1322.
81. Seeid at 1322-23.
82. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, §§ 723, 763 (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(13)(C)(i)-(iv)).
83. See id. (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)). Clearing and margins requirements are central
features of exchange markets, but were long absent in the unregulated OTC markets. JICKLING &
RUANE, supra note 23, at 3-5. Clearing and margin requirements are generally described as
follows: "[b]efore the trade, both [parties) . . . deposit an initial margin payment with the
clearinghouse to cover potential losses. At the end of each trading day, all ... those who have
lost money ...

must post additional margin ... to cover those losses before the next trade ....

"

Id. at 3. This process alleviates the concern of a counterparty default because the clearinghouse
holds sufficient funds to make payments. Id.
84. JICKLUNG & RUANE, supra note 23, at 5-6 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1)).
85. Id. at 7.
86. Skeel, supra note 20, at 193.
87. Id. at 193-94.
88. Franklin G. Monsour, Jr., STOLI and Intent: The Feeling's Mutual, But It's Starting
Not to Matter Anyway, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 679, 686 (2011) (citing Grigsby v.
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insurance contract.89
In contrast, an insurable interest requirement has been, and after
Dodd-Frank, still is absent from the regulatory framework of
derivatives. 90 As such, there is no mechanism in place to mitigate the
moral hazard inherent in the ability for one party to benefit from another
party's default. Therefore, Dodd-Frank, which fails to address this
concern, should have imposed a similar requirement on derivative
contracts.91
Yet another concern of derivatives relates to their two distinct, yet
mutually dependent, functions: hedging and speculating. 92 On the one
to risk.93
hand, corporations may use derivatives to hedge their exposure
A board's decision to use derivatives for such a purpose falls squarely
within the protection of the business judgment rule. 94 On the other hand,
a long-standing concern relating to the speculative function of
derivatives is that such use is a form of gambling. 95 Despite this
concern, the speculative function of derivatives is essential to the
hedging function because derivative transactions are
viability of the 96
games.
zero-sum
Dodd-Frank attempts to distinguish the two mutually dependent
functions by regulating speculative transactions and generally
exempting hedging transactions from its purview. 97 For instance, DoddFrank's mandatory clearing requirements do not apply to certain
hedging transactions.98 On its face, such a provision appears to preserve
the ability of corporations to hedge risk by protecting them against the
costly undertaking of complying with Dodd-Frank. In substance,
however, Dodd-Frank creates an economically inefficient result because
regulating speculative transactions makes it more costly for
Russell, 222 U.S. 149-55 (1911)).
89. See generally Kimball-Stanley, Insurance and Credit Default Swaps: Should Like
Things Be TreatedAlike?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 241, 241 (2008).

90.
CDSs and
91.
92.
93.
94.

See Skeel, supra note 20, at 193-94 (discussing the potential moral hazards created by
regulation of CDSs in a similar manner to other insurance regimes).
See id (suggesting an economic purpose requirement in derivatives transactions).
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corporations to use derivatives for hedging risk.9 9

For example, if institutions determine that the cost of complying
with Dodd-Frank exceeds the benefit of engaging in speculative
derivative transactions, those firms should, from an economic
standpoint, not engage in those transactions. As a result, the cost of
hedging risk increases because of the decreased supply of parties
willing to embrace the risk that hedgers seek to avoid. In fact, some
suggest that an efficient result is best obtained by reducing the
regulation of exchange-traded00derivatives rather than increasing the
regulation of OTC derivatives.
This Note does not suggest resorting to such an extreme because the
lack of derivatives regulation was a contributing factor to the financial
crisis.l°1 Instead, recognizing the inefficiencies that Dodd-Frank creates,
this Note suggests that a more efficient result would ensue if firms with
significant derivative positions were required to disclose those positions
to their shareholders. to2 This suggestion of enhanced disclosure would
not erode the business judgment rule because corporate hedging would
still fall within the scope of the rule's protection. Instead, this proposal
merely permits shareholders to "get out" if they disagree with a firm's
direction and, as a result, allows the market to dictate the corporate use
of derivatives. As it stands now, if Dodd-Frank drives speculators out of
the market, corporate
managers will have to create a new mechanism
10 3
for managing risk.
B. Say-on-Pay: CongressionalIntrusion into CorporateGovernance
Corporations employ performance-based compensation as a
mechanism for reducing agency costs. 104 However, the prevalent view
in the United States, as demonstrated by public outrage,'0 5 is that
executive compensation was a major cause of the financial crisis. 10 6 In
response to this view, Congress enacted say-on-pay provisions as part of
the Dodd-Frank Act, 1°7 which require public companies to obtain a
99. Skeel, supra note 20, at 153.
100. Id. at 191-92.
101. See Foster, supra note 4 (discussing underlying policies and history leading to the
financial crisis).
102. See generally Jeffery S. Puretz with Assistance from Hogan Pham & Stephen Ferrara,
New Developmentsfor Investment Advisors and New Developments in Derivatives Disclosure
for Investment Companies, 16 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 893 (2010) (discussing the SEC's rule requiring
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103.

Id.

104.
105.
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107.

See supra text accompanying notes 66-74.
See Bethune, supra note 55, at 588.
See id.
See id.
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nonbinding vote from their shareholders on executive compensation
plan once every three years.' 0
Executive compensation is only unreasonable "if it fails to generate a
corresponding increase in the value of the company beyond the cost of
the compensation. ..,,09 During the financial crisis, however, increases
in executive compensation did not correlate with increases in firm
value.' Further, the business judgment rule traditionally protected a
board's decisions with respect to executive compensation. 1 Therefore,
prior to Dodd-Frank, shareholders had little voice on the matter of
executive compensation.
Say-on-pay advocates mistakenly suggest that the provisions
empower shareholders and advance shareholder primacy.'2 In fact,
President Obama has suggested that the say-on-pay provisions empower
shareholders with respect to executive compensation. 1 13 In substance,
however, these provisions do not empower shareholders to any
meaningful extent because their vote is nonbinding. This Note does not
suggest adopting a binding vote; rather, it posits that neither a binding
vote nor a nonbinding vote is warranted.
Although say-on-pay advocates suggest that the provisions restore
trust, 1 14 this Note concludes otherwise. Imagine a scenario in which
shareholders vote against a proposed executive compensation package,
and the board, in good faith, rejects that vote. In that situation, even
though the board acted properly, shareholders, operating under the
mistaken belief that the board acted imprudently, may lose confidence
in the board and either sell their shares or vote against board members
in future elections. As such, say-on-pay provisions promote inefficiency
by encouraging boards to yield to shareholder demands even if those
108. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, § 951 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78n-1) (2012). Further, the say-on-pay provisions require companies to disclose certain
executive compensation information such as: (1) the ratio of executive compensation to the
median compensation level of company employees; and (2) the relationship between executive
compensation and the company's financial performance. Id.
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110. See id at 592-93.
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demands are not in the best interest of the corporation. Although a
binding vote would resolve the trust problem, doing so would create the
same inefficiencies and would erode the business judgment rule.
In addition to creating trust and efficiency problems, the say-on-pay
provisions also promote frivolous litigation 115 and, in doing so,
undermine traditional corporate governance theory. Traditionally, under
the business judgment rule, executive compensation decisions are left to
16
the business judgment of boards of directors and their committees.
Further, Dodd-Frank, by its terms, neither usurps that power nor
changes a board's fiduciary duties.'
That notion, however, was
jeopardized following the first proxy season of the say-on-pay era.
In 2011, the shareholders of several companies, grounding their
complaints on breaches of fiduciary duties, filed derivative suits
challenging their respective board's decisions to reject negative say-onpay votes. 8 Although those challenges were generally unsuccessful," 19
one federal district court judge, Judge Timothy Black, refused to
dismiss the shareholders' complaint.' 0 That refusal is troublesome
given the long-standing precedent of deferring to a board's decisions
regarding executive compensation. 12 Therefore, Dodd-Frank both
undercuts this theory of corporate governance and intrudes22 into state
law even though its express terms indicate a contrary intent.'
Even if Judge Black's decision is an outlier and judges continue to
dismiss such shareholder complaints, the say-on-pay provisions create
another problem for corporations. That is, the nonbinding vote may
encourage shareholders to challenge a board's decision to reject a
negative vote in hopes of obtaining a settlement. In fact, one company
paid almost two million dollars to settle this type of shareholder
derivative suit. 23 Therefore, Dodd-Frank's say-on-pay provisions not
only undercut the traditional theory of corporate governance, but also,
115.
116.

Id.
Bethune, supra note 55, at 604.
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impose significant costs on corporations.
IV. CONCLUSION

The financial crisis of 2008 devastated the global economy. The
crisis resulted from an array of factors such as derivative transactions,
sub-prime lending, deregulation, corporate governance failures, and
greed. The public was outraged, and a congressional response was
necessary. As such, Congress responded to the crisis by enacting DoddFrank.
In passing Dodd-Frank, Congress sought to bring transparency to the
complex derivatives that nearly destroyed the American and global
financial systems. It also sought to reform corporate governance by
providing shareholders with a say on executive compensation.
Collectively, these two components of Dodd-Frank promote an
inefficient form of corporate governance.
Dodd-Frank's derivative regulations are morally inadequate and
economically inefficient. From a moral standpoint, the Act fails to
alleviate the moral hazard inherent in the ability for one party to benefit
from another party's default. Moreover, Dodd-Frank promotes an
inefficient form of corporate governance by making it more costly for
corporations to manage risk. This Note concludes that Dodd-Frank
should have required corporations to disclose their derivative positions
to shareholders. Doing so would have created an efficient form of
corporate governance in which the market would dictate the corporate
use of derivatives.
Dodd-Frank's say-on-pay provisions are a regulatory intrusion into
corporate governance and state law. Dodd-Frank, by its terms, is not
intended to alter state corporate law. Nevertheless, the Act does alter
state corporate law to the extent that shareholders can challenge board
decisions and either survive motions to dismiss or collect settlement
proceeds. Further, the provisions promote an inefficient form of
corporate governance by encouraging boards to yield to shareholder
demands regarding executive compensation, even if those demands are
not in the best interest of the corporation. This Note suggests that
shareholder empowerment in the area of executive compensation is not
warranted.
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